

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Plans and Policy Staff, ORE

DATE: 4 October 1948

FROM : [REDACTED] Plans and Policy Staff, ORE

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Conference re Petroleum Intelligence

1. An informal conference was held at 0930, 1 October 1948 at the Pentagon, and attended by:

Col. Webster Anderson

Joint Logistic Plans Group

CIA

CIA

2. The purpose of the conference was to determine, if possible, the informal views of Col. Anderson with reference to petroleum intelligence (on an unofficial basis).

3. It is to be noted that among JLPG's (Joint Logistic Plans Group) most important responsibilities is that of estimating the logistic support required for plans evolved by the JSPC (Joint Strategic Plans Committee). Such studies cover possible military action by US Armed Forces anywhere in the world and may include allied participation. Since petroleum is indispensable for land, sea and air operations, and accounts for the bulk of military supplies transported, its ready availability where and when needed, in required kinds and quantities, is of major concern in the preparation of satisfactory logistic estimates. These calculations, to be realistic, must be supported by sound foreign intelligence. Although the USSR, now considered this country's only important enemy, ranks high among the JLPG's areas of special interest, the logistics of Satellites, probable allies and neutrals and the sea approaches likewise constitute important subjects for study by the Group.

4. In Col. Anderson's opinion, foreign oil intelligence estimates as developed through JIC, or separately by State, War, Navy or Air Intelligence are inadequate because they are not usually subjected to a critical review by logisticians and technical specialists. On the other hand, he believes that material prepared by ASPB (Armed Services Petroleum Board), with whom JLPG works closely on oil problems, would often be more useful if produced against a background of political and economic intelligence which is not a function of that Board. Col. Anderson feels that the preparation individually of estimates of the oil situation in foreign countries by the several intelligence, planning and operational agencies produces confusing results, involves needless duplication and often fails to utilize fully the abilities of persons who are, and those who are not but should be, working on the problem.

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5. The foregoing deficiencies, Col. Anderson believes in large part, could be remedied if the preparation of responsible foreign petroleum intelligence studies were accomplished as the integrated effort of a team of highly qualified intelligence specialists, logisticians and oil technicians. The group or committee should be established on a permanent basis. Col. Anderson feels, as the international petroleum situation and the oil positions of many foreign countries should be kept under continuing review.

6. Col. Anderson suggests that the desired result probably could be assured by:

- a. Establishment of a ^{formal} standing committee sponsored by CIA, or *the institution of a directive from N.S.C. to CIA giving*
- b. ~~Assumption by CIA of~~ the responsibility of producing the required intelligence with ~~the latter agency requesting~~ the assistance of certain other government agencies concerned with petroleum abroad, *including JCS participation*

In either case he believes that the following agencies should participate:

Central Intelligence Agency
JCS (JLPG and JIG)
Armed Services Petroleum Board
National Security Resources Board
Department of State (Petroleum Division)

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